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This article presents an operationalized solution to the mind-body 
problem which relies on rigorously defined theoretical reasoning rather 
than philosophical argument.  We identify a specific operation which is 
a necessary property of all healthy human conscious individuals -- 
specifically the operation of self-certainty, or the capacity of healthy 
conscious humans to "know" with certainty that they are conscious.   
This operation is shown to be inconsistent with the properties possible 
in any meaningful definition of a physical system.  This inconsistency is 
demonstrated by proving a "no-go" theorem for any physical system 
capable of human logical reasoning, if this reasoning is required to be 
both sound and consistent.  The proof of this theorem is both general -- 
it applies to any function whereby evidence affects the state of some 
physical system -- and recursive, since any physical process subserving 
a function of this type is shown to imply another such function.  Thus for
at least one aspect of human consciousness, the mind-body problem is 
now conclusively resolved.
Introduction
Of all the problems in the study of human consciousness, the mind-body problem has 
undoubtedly proven the most intractable to date.  Chalmers (1996) has referred to this 
as the Hard Problem, of consciousness, and a study of the literature on this topic finds 
little agreement as to its likely solution.  Some approaches (see for example 
Churchland, 1996;  Dennett 1996;  Hacker 2010) deny the problem even exists at all.  
So far, however, all approaches to the mind-body problem have been philosophical in 
character, and scientific analysis has tended to avoid the question.  Chalmers' own 
approach to the problem relies on the notion of "philosophical zombies" -- beings 
physically identical to conscious human beings but without subjective experience.  
Chalmers' arguments are typically philosophical in nature, relying on concepts which 
are expressed in ambiguous verbal forms and which therefore provide opportunities 
for considerable misinterpretation.  
The beginnings of a way out of this impasse came in 1995 when Gilbert Caplain 
published an outline for a proof that consciousness could not be a computational 
property using arguments drawn from computer science and logic, rather than 
philosophy.  Caplain's proof was expressed only in outline, and necessarily relied on 
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much philosophical terminology such as knowledge, justification and belief without 
giving precise theoretical definitions of these terms.  However Caplain's proof did 
incorporate one highly innovative development -- it did not rely on some general, 
poorly defined notion of consciousness as an entity, but instead focused on one 
particular property associated with human consciousness.  Furthermore the property 
Caplain chose, the capacity of human beings to know with certainty that they are 
conscious, is a property that can be represented as a specific operation.  Thus Caplain 
pointed the way to an operationalized approach to the mind-body problem, in which 
undefined or poorly defined notions of consciousness or subjectivity could be 
replaced by rigorously defined operations.  Caplain's proof therefore offered the 
promise of being expressible not as a philosophical argument, but as a logical theorem
deriving from rigorously defined premises.
In a recent paper the present author (Reason 2016) attempted to expand Caplain's 
outline, by showing how it could be generalized to all physical systems and by 
attempting to remove all ambiguity arising from the use of undefined philosophical 
terms.  Informal communications subsequently revealed this attempt to be only 
partially successful, and considerable ambiguity remained over the use of such terms 
as certainty and reliability.  Two issues quickly became apparent from these informal 
communications.  Firstly, that most readers were of the view that there must be 
something wrong with the proof; that it was in some way artificial, or contrived, or 
"playing with words".  Secondly, that it was extremely difficult for some readers to 
disentangle their thinking from their intuitions and introspections about their own 
conscious experience.  The only way of dealing with these difficulties is to present the
proof in as rigorous a manner as I am able, even if the level of detail required for this 
sometimes looks like overkill.
The purpose of this current paper is threefold:  Firstly, to explain the logic of Caplain's
proof in an intuitive, easily accessible form;  secondly, to illustrate how an operational
approach can convert a verbal philosophical argument into a rigorous theoretical 
proof; and thirdly, to express Caplain's proof in just such a rigorous, theoretical form.  
Philosophers who read this paper are asked to bear in mind that there are important 
differences between a theoretical proof and a philosophical argument; many of the 
misconceptions which philosophers have had about this proof are the result of not 
fully appreciating these differences.  Some of these misconceptions will be listed 
toward the end of this article.
The rationale behind Caplain's proof
The theoretical argument underlying Caplain's proof is extremely simple, and is in 
fact simply an extension of Descartes' evil demon thought experiment -- which tends 
to be presented in modern formulations as a "brain in a vat".  For those unfamiliar 
with this thought experiment, here is a brief summary.   We are asked to consider the 
possibility that we are in fact disembodied brains, kept alive in tanks or vats of 
nutrients, and that all our experiences of the outside world are in fact illusions created 
through direct stimulation of our sensory receptors by electrical or other means.  The 
situation is in fact exactly that described in the well-known "Matrix" series of movies.
The upshot of this is that our sensory experience is identical regardless of whether it is
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ultimately generated by the external world we think we perceive, or whether it is 
generated directly by means of some sort of deceptive apparatus.  So we can never 
know for certain, on the basis of sensory experience, whether the external world really
exists.
Caplain's proof simply extends this thought experiment from sensory perception to 
introspection.  In a computing machine, the output of every act of either perception or 
introspection must be represented by some sort of symbolic state.  This state must be 
the result of some computational process, and the only way of establishing the 
accuracy of that process is by the application of some other process.  This leads to an 
infinite regress along the lines of Munchhausen's Trilemma.
The version of Caplain's proof which I am presenting here is constructed according to 
the following rationale.  First, we operationalize consciousness in terms of an 
operation I shall call self-certainty, which will be described more fully in the next 
section.  This enables us to represent consciousness as a simple function (the function 
of answering a YES/NO question).  Self-certainty is thus a specific example of a 
general class of functions, consisting of all functions which answer YES/NO 
questions.
If we can then show that, for a given class of physical systems, no YES/NO question 
can be answered with certainty, we will have shown that self-certainty is impossible in
that class of physical systems.  The class of physical systems we choose is that class 
of physical systems which can exhibit humanlike logical reasoning, since human 
beings must by definition exhibit humanlike reasoning.  Any system capable of 
humanlike logical reasoning we shall call H.
The proof which is to be presented here is the sequence of inferences in H which 
establish that no physical system reasoning in H can answer any YES/NO question 
with certainty.  Therefore, if this proof A is sound, no physical system capable of 
reasoning in H is capable of self-certainty.
It follows that, if we assume that all healthy conscious human beings are capable of 
self-certainty, we have shown that no healthy human being can be an exclusively 
physical system.
Explaining the Operational Approach
Consider the situation in this somewhat contrived little thought experiment:
Two philosophers are arguing about whether buses run on time in northwest London.  
Philosopher A wants to know whether the H12 bus runs on time.  He decides to 
choose the Pinner High Street bus stop and counts how often the bus is on time at that 
particular stop.  He finds the bus is late more often than not at that particular stop, and
so concludes that the H12 bus does not run on time.  So here we have:
Premise 1:  If the H12 bus runs on time then it will stop at Pinner High Street on time;
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Premise 2:  The H12 bus does not stop at Pinner High Street on time;
Conclusion:  The H12 does not run on time.
Clearly one can argue about the sampling difficulties associated with this little 
experiment, but let us leave that aside.  Instead we introduce Philosopher B, who 
examines the experiment and declares the first premise to be unsound.   According to 
Philosopher B, buses stop for all sorts of reasons; they may break down, or they may 
get stuck in traffic.  Or it may be a public holiday and the buses are not running at all. 
It does not follow, says Philosopher B, that because buses do not stop at some 
particular place, and at some particular time, they must be running late.  Philosopher 
A, according to Philosopher B, has just made an unsound assumption about the 
meaning of the term "bus stop".
Of course it should be simple to work this out.  After all, everyone knows what a bus 
stop is and everyone should know what Philosopher A means by a bus stop.  But 
philosophy is prone to a rather peculiar disorder in situations like these, which I shall 
term a "sigh of relief and stop thinking" reaction.  By which I mean that Philosopher 
B has found an ambiguous meaning which he can misinterpret to his benefit, and so 
immediately sighs with relief and stops thinking.
Philosopher A now returns to his study and publishes an explanation of exactly what 
he means by a bus stop, and why his experiment depends only on that meaning of the 
term "bus stop",  and not on any other meaning.  But by this time Philosopher B has 
moved on.  He has completely forgotten the point of the original argument and is now 
making general assertions such as "There is no reason to suppose any relationship 
between the lateness of buses and the timing of their stops.  In fact the whole notion 
of a 'bus stop' probably lacks any coherent meaning to begin with."
The purpose of this admittedly rather absurd scenario is to illustrate a situation which 
will be familiar to anyone who has ever followed a philosophical debate; a situation 
which might be called "motivated misunderstanding".  Philosophical arguments are 
phrased in natural language terms, but their referents often involve metaphysical 
issues, or other issues which are hard to define unambiguously.  Chalmers (2011) 
refers to this type of problem as a "verbal dispute", and suggests various ways of 
resolving the difficulty.  However his methods of resolution depend on the assumption
that both parties to a dispute are motivated to come to a common understanding.  One 
might suspect, given human nature, that some parties to a dispute might not have an 
incentive to arrive at a common understanding if the result is that their particular 
views are disproved or discredited.  Such individuals would therefore be motivated to 
prevent the ambiguity being resolved.  It would be difficult to arrive at a common 
understanding in such a case.
In science this situation is avoided, because scientific investigations try to avoid 
metaphysical questions and to concentrate on problems where the relevant factors can 
be strictly defined, observed and measured.  The operational approach is one way of 
doing this (Bridgeman 1927).  In the operational approach to measurement, for 
example, one avoids the temptation to regard measurements of physical quantities as 
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"proxies" for some sort of metaphysical property.  Consider the operation of 
measuring the length of some physical object by placing a measuring rod alongside it.
One might be tempted to regard the reading from the measuring rod as a proxy of 
some sort for some metaphysical property called "length" which cannot be directly 
observed.  However this raises inevitable questions about how the relationship 
between the proxy and the underlying metaphysical property can be established, given
that the latter cannot be directly observed.  These difficulties are circumvented if one 
regards the physical quantity "length" to be just the result obtained by placing a 
measuring rod alongside something.  The output of the measuring operation is 
therefore to be taken as synonymous with the physical property "length".  One can 
thus carry out measurements of physical quantities without worrying about what 
metaphysical properties, if any, may be associated with those quantities.
Of course there are limits to how far one can apply this approach to questions of 
interest to philosophers, since issues of metaphysics are fundamental to many of these
questions.  The nature of consciousness -- in particular the so-called "Hard Problem" 
of consciousness -- is a case in point.  Caplain's work, however, shows that even in the
study of consciousness, there are problems which can be treated by the operational 
approach and so lifted from the realm of philosophical speculation into the domain of 
theoretical and scientific analysis.
To see how this is so, we must note that Caplain's proof applies not to some 
indefinable metaphysical quality of consciousness, but to a very specific and well-
defined operation -- that is, the operation whereby a conscious human being comes to 
"know" (in Caplain's words) with certainty that they are conscious.  This operation 
can be expressed as the process of answering a binary question -- a question for which
the answer is either YES or NO.  If a conscious human subject asks the question "Am 
I certainly conscious?" , then there should be some operation associated with that 
subject's consciousness which is capable of giving the answer YES to that question.  
One can then ask whether that operation is one that can be performed by some 
physical system (although Caplain's original outline proof applied only to computing 
machines).  If it turns out that the answer to this question is no, then the mind-body 
problem is at least partially resolved without any consideration having to be given to 
the metaphysical nature of consciousness itself.  That is to say, one could prove that 
consciousness cannot wholly be a physical process without worrying about what 
consciousness itself actually is. This advantage of the operational approach saves us a 
lot of work.  For example, one currently fashionable explanation for the Hard Problem
is Illusionism (see for example Frankish 2016, Blackmore 2016).  Illusionism is based
on the premise that the properties of consciousness are not what they subjectively 
appear to be.  But the operational approach enables us the sidestep the question of 
whether this doctrine is true, or even whether it is coherent.  
Of course in order to do this one needs to do far more than just operationalize 
consciousness.  One also needs to operationalize the concept of a physical system 
itself, and also define rigorously any other assumptions which are necessary to 
demonstrate an inconsistency between the operation of ascertaining that one is 
certainly conscious and the properties of physical systems.   How might this be done?
If our intention is to demonstrate an inconsistency between an operationalized 
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definition of consciousness and an operationalized definition of a physical system, 
then it is essential that any definitions and terms employed be unambiguous.   Any 
terms associated with metaphysics, such as belief, or knowledge, or justification, 
should be avoided since these are likely to be interpreted in subtly different ways by 
different readers, and these different ways are likely to have hidden assumptions built 
into them.   Likewise it is important not to get bogged down in the quagmire of human
epistemology -- we are not interested in the question of how human beings "know" 
things, or "understand" things, or how they become certain of things.  All such 
questions are irrelevant to our task and any terminology relating to such questions is 
to be avoided.  To the extent we are interested in epistemology at all, we are interested
only in the epistemology of physical systems.
Assumptions necessary for an operationalized formulation of the proof
In order to express the proof in a form that can reasonably be described as rigorous, it 
is necessary to list the assumptions and premises on which his proof depends, in a 
clear and unambiguous form.  This we shall now proceed to do2.   
We first need some sort of definition of a physical system.  It should be borne in mind 
here that the purpose of our definitions is to eliminate ambiguity, not to provide a 
comprehensive description.  We can therefore operationalize the definition of a 
physical system in terms of some general property which a physical system must 
possess, without attempting to capture the full meaning of the term "physical system".
We therefore define a physical system as some set of physical processes, where a 
physical process is defined as follows:
Definition:  A physical process is some entity which has an objective existence and is 
capable of evolving in time.
Philosophers use the notion of supervenience to refer to entities which are not 
themselves physical systems but whose existence is nonetheless consistent with the 
doctrine of physicalism.   An entity S is said to be supervenient on some basis B if 
two things which have the same B properties must have the same S properties (Kim  
1984).   Mental processes are thus assumed to supervene on physical processes.  
Hence the following expression:
Principle of Physicalism3:  All mental processes supervene on some physical process 
or set of processes.
(The notion of a mental process will be expressed more formally in the next section.) 
Our operationalized notion of consciousness also needs to be expressed a little more 
specifically.  We shall call this notion self-certainty:
Definition:  Self-certainty is the capacity of at least some conscious beings to verify 
2The premises listed here were originally given in Reason (2016).  They are presented here in an 
expanded form, together with explanations as to why they have been chosen.
3
 Referred to as Principle F' in Reason (2016)
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with absolute certainty that they are conscious -- that is, to give the answer YES to the
question "Am I certainly conscious?"
It is important to emphasize that it is only absolute certainty which is at issue here.  
Caplain's proof does not imply that physical systems cannot be reasonably certain of 
being conscious, or that they might have a certainty of being conscious which is 
contingent on additional assumptions.  For example Chalmers (2012)  postulates an 
analogous situation involving mathematical reasoning; in this example an expert 
mathematician is given cause to doubt the accuracy of his own mathematical musings 
by being offered the possibility that he has been administered some sort of drug which
destroys the capacity  for mathematical reasoning.   Chalmers suggests that the 
mathematician could regain confidence in the accuracy of his own cogitations by 
insulating himself from all such questions (that is to say, by ignoring them).    
Certainty of this sort, which depends on additional assumptions, is not covered by 
Caplain's proof and does not constitute self-certainty.  We can express this as:
Condition 1:   An entity is self-certain only if its certainty is absolute (beyond any 
possibility of error) and does not depend on additional assumptions.
It is also necessary to emphasize that self-certainty does not require assumptions to be
made about the nature of consciousness.  Any such assumptions -- for example, that 
consciousness equates to wakefulness, or that consciousness requires some specific 
sort of self-awareness -- should therefore not be made.   A conscious being might, for 
example, be experiencing a lucid dream or some other altered state of consciousness.  
So long as the conscious being can verify that it is in some conscious state or other, 
the requirement for self-certainty is satisfied.  We express this as:
Condition 2:   Self-certainty does not require that the conscious state which is found 
to exist has any particular property or set of properties.4  
Our next two premises refer to the rules of logical inference by which Caplain's proof 
can be established.  Our objective is to prove Caplain's result as a rigorous theorem, 
but it must be admitted that this cannot be done in the context of any specified formal 
system.  Even if such a formal system should exist, we do not know what it is.  
Fortunately, however, these details can be overlooked.   If we start with the 
assumption that our own ability to reason logically, as human beings, is in principle 
sound5 (which is a necessary assumption for any sort of theoretical work whatsoever) 
4
The significance of this condition cannot be overstated.  Philosophers who find the operational 
approach objectionable (and this includes just about every philosopher who has ever contacted me on 
the subject) argue that nothing can be inferred about the nature of consciousness from such operational 
definitions.  Condition 2 illustrates that this situation is intentional.  The no-go theorem to be proven in 
the following section depends on this operational definition alone, and not on any philosophical notions
about what consciousness is or should be.  To underline this, one can express self-certainty as illusory 
self-certainty, as in the sentence "It is absolutely certain that I have at least the illusion of being 
conscious" without affecting the validity of the proof.
5
 At first glance this may seem to be inconsistent with Condition 1 -- however this is not the case.  
Condition 1 requires only that self-certainty does not require additional assumptions ; however it is 
necessary to make additional assumptions in order to go beyond self-certainty and to prove Caplain's 
result.
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then we can conclude that the necessary rules of inference are precisely those which 
enable us, as human beings, to reason logically.  Any system which incorporates these
particular rules of inference, we shall call H. This leads to the following two 
assumptions:
Assumption 1:  There exists a physical system M which supports the logical system 
H;
Assumption 2:   H is in principle both sound and consistent.
"Sound in principle" simply means that if a system reasoning with H makes a mistake,
there is no reason in principle why it should eventually not correct that mistake.6  H 
does not therefore condemn any system using it to fallacious logical reasoning which 
can never be corrected.  By "correct", we mean of course that H incorporates a 
capacity for  classical inference.  There may well be many different formal systems, 
with different sets of axioms and different rules of inference, which exhibit the 
necessary properties of H, or it may be that there is no such formal system.  By 
defining H in the way we do, we manage to avoid this question entirely.  However 
since H is defined only implicitly, derivations in H cannot be given in the way they 
would be for formally specified systems.  Such derivations must be presented instead 
in terms of the intuitive logic which supervenes on H.  For this reason the following 
proof must be presented in somewhat tedious detail, in order that each inference may 
be checked individually by the reader.
An operational formulation of Caplain's proof
We are now in a position to present Caplain's proof in a rigorous form.  The proof will
now be presented in a number of stages, and each milestone will be clearly identified 
and numbered.  The reader is invited to consider the reasonableness of each inference 
as it is presented.  Should any reader find the accompanying profusion of Greek 
letters and other algebraic symbols somewhat bewildering, they may find it useful to 
consult the simpler proof in Reason (2016), in which they do not appear.
It will be convenient to restrict our considerations to mental processes which can be 
represented as functions.   We will define M to be some physical system, and j to be 
some function which yields the answer to a YES/NO question.   We shall begin with 
the simplest case in which all questions can be considered to refer to propositions 
which are either TRUE or UNTRUE.   The function j therefore represents the 
mapping
TRUE ® YES
UNTRUE® NO
6
 Another way of looking at this, which is perhaps strictly more accurate, is to assert that H is sound but
that individual intelligent beings are noisy theorem-provers in H.  That is to say, intelligent beings can 
prove theorems in H but are subject to random errors.  However they are not subject to systematic 
errors.
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where TRUE and UNTRUE are the possible truth-values of some proposition p.  We 
shall call the range of this function the evidence state of p.   So if T represents the 
truth-value of p, and K represents the evidence state of p, the mapping can be 
represented as
K = j(T)
We now present this as our first milestone:
Milestone 1:  Any mental process which is equivalent to the process of answering a 
YES/NO question can be expressed as a function of the form j.
The equivalence covers mental processes which may not themselves be answers to 
YES/NO questions, but can be represented as such:  For example, the mental process 
of thinking "I exist" is equivalent to the process of answering the YES/NO question 
"Do I exist?"
In a physical system M, an evidence state of some proposition p can be any state of M
correlated with the correct truth-value for p, and the function j will be performed by 
some physical process P, as is required by the Principle of Physicalism.  This gives us 
a general format for mental processes in a physical system.  If T is the truth value for 
some proposition p, and K is the corresponding evidence state for T, then
K = O(P)
where O is the output of some physical process P.  This is to say that if TRUE is the 
correct truth value for p, then M will evolve to state KT, and if TRUE is not the correct
truth value for p, then M will evolve to some state nonKT.  Thus P executes the 
mapping:
TRUE ® KT
not TRUE ® nonKT
where KT and nonKT are separate states of M.  We shall call this mapping p.
It is possible that T is a physical state of M, and furthermore that T is the same 
physical state as K; KT however cannot be the same physical state as nonKT.  Some 
decision is therefore always required as to whether M evolves to KT or to nonKT.  This
decision , and the subsequent evolution of M, constitute the process P.  This leads us 
to our second milestone:
Milestone 2:   Any physical instantiation of a function in the form of j can be 
expressed as a mapping in the form of p, which will be performed by some physical 
process P.
Now consider the mapping which does the reverse of p, that is the mapping:
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TRUE ® nonKT
not TRUE ® KT
a mapping which we shall call r.  It is nonetheless clear that r has the same form as p,
and by Milestone 2 there will be some physical process which performs it, which we 
shall call R.  We shall express this as our next milestone:
Milestone 3:  For every mapping of the form p performed by a physical process P, 
there will be some contradictory mapping of the form r and some physical process R 
which performs this7.
But if K represents the evidence state of some true proposition, how is M to ascertain 
whether the state K has been produced by P or by R?  It clearly matters, because if K 
has been produced by P then KT will represent the answer YES to some question, but 
if K has been produced by R, then KT will represent the answer NO to that same 
question.   To resolve this difficulty, it is clearly necessary for M to ascertain whether 
K has been produced by P or by R!
Another way of looking at this is to say that P is an accurate instantiation of j but that
R is an inaccurate instantiation of j.   In this case KT will always represent the 
evidence state YES, but if K has been produced by P then K will be a correct evidence
state, whereas if K has been produced by R then K will be an incorrect evidence state.
This brings us to the notion of failure, which is always a necessary consideration 
when dealing with processes in the real world, as opposed to the idealized 
mathematical functions they perform.  We can express this notion in terms of the 
following axiom:8
Axiom of Fallibility:  Given any arbitrarily selected physical process, whose 
properties have not been ascertained, it is impossible to be certain that this process 
will or will not perform some given function.
In other words, if we have a physical system M in which there exists some evidence 
state K, produced by some process which is supposed to instantiate a function of the 
form j, it is impossible to be sure whether that state has been produced by the process
P or by the process R without ascertaining any of the properties of the process.   We 
might be able to deduce through logical deduction what that process should be, but we
cannot through logical deduction alone deduce what that process actually is in any 
given case.  
How could we ascertain the properties of this mysterious process?  We could either 
examine the process directly, or we could examine the mapping performed by the 
process, which entails examining the states between which the mapping occurs.  In 
7
   This can always be done by applying a logical NOT operator to the truth value before performing j 
☻. Therefore if P exists, so does R.
8
   It is convenient at this point to express the notion of failure as an axiom of H, but it is not strictly 
necessary.  Later we shall show how it is possible to express the notion of failure without assuming the 
Axiom of Fallibility.
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the former case we could ask, for example, "Does this process have the properties of P
or of R?"  This is clearly equivalent to asking either the questions "Does this process 
have the properties of P?" and "Does this process have the properties of R?"  These 
are clearly YES/NO questions and so by Milestone 1 can be expressed as functions of 
the form j -- let us call this particular function j1.  
In the second case we could ask, for example, "Does this process map T on to K?"  
This is also clearly a YES/NO question and so is also expressible as a function of the 
form j.  Let us call this particular function j2.  
By Milestone 2, any physical instantiation of these functions can be expressed as a 
mapping of the form p, which will be performed by some physical process.  In either 
case call this process P'.
By Milestone 3 there will exist for this mapping a corresponding mapping of the form
r, which will be performed by some physical process we shall call R'.
From the Axiom of Fallibility it follows that one cannot determine if the actual 
physical process which instantiates j1 or j2 in the physical system M, is P' or R' (or 
indeed some completely different third process as yet unidentified) without 
ascertaining the properties of this actual process.  But ascertaining the properties of an
actual physical process (as opposed to an idealized one) is equivalent to a function of 
the form j.  And by the Principle of Physicalism, M can only perform functions of the
form j by means of some physical process.  This leads to the following rather 
awkward state of affairs:
A physical system M can only perform some function of the form j by means of some
physical process;
M can only ascertain the correctness of some physical process by performing some 
function of the form j.
This is either circular or leads to an infinite regress.  The nature of the infinite regress 
is easily demonstrated by examining the functions which need to be performed.  If the
first function can be represented as 
K0 = j0(T0)
where K0 is the evidence state of some proposition p0 and T0 is the truth value of p0; 
then subsequent functions can be represented as
Ki = ji(Ti)
where Ki and Ti are the evidence state and truth value respectively of some 
proposition pi where pi is equivalent to answering the YES/NO question:
"Is the function which answers the question equivalent to pi - 1 correctly performed?"
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Clearly the number of questions, which would need to be answered in order to 
establish that any given j-type function has been performed correctly, is at least 
countably infinite.
The upshot of all this is that M can never establish with provable accuracy whether 
any of its processes is accurate or inaccurate9, since establishing this requires a non-
terminating sequence of processes.   It does not yet follow, however, that M cannot 
arrive at the conclusion that all its processes are accurate.  M might, indeed, be correct
to conclude that all of its processes are accurate.   However such a conclusion cannot 
be a logically valid theorem in H; there is no logically sound chain of reasoning in H 
by which M can show that any of its processes is accurate.    To put this in slightly 
less technical language, it is impossible to prove in H that any of M's processes is 
accurate.
If this is not yet obvious, consider the following:  We have established above a chain 
of reasoning which shows that any attempt by M to establish the accuracy of any of its
processes  logically implies an infinite regress.  We have established this conclusion 
by means of our own human capacity for logical reasoning; a capacity which we have 
labeled H.  By Assumption 2, H is in principle sound and consistent.  If H is sound 
and consistent, then it cannot support a stable10 chain of reasoning which would lead 
to a conclusion inconsistent with other conclusions already established in H; that is to 
say, with other theorems in H.  M might be able to derive a logically valid proof in 
some other system, say nonH, that some of its processes were accurate; but then by 
definition M could not be a human being.11  One can therefore say that the statement 
"M cannot prove the accuracy of any of its processes" is equivalent to a theorem in H.
If at this point we invoke Assumption 1, then M itself can establish that none of its 
processes is provably accurate.  Since M can reason according to the system H, M can
prove any theorem that can be proven by a human being; this includes the proposition 
"M cannot prove the accuracy of any of its processes".  To express this in slightly less 
formal terms, we can say that if a human being, reasoning according to the principles 
of H, can show that M cannot establish the accuracy of any of its own processes, then 
M can do the same.
This is an extremely raw and primitive version of the proof we need, which applies 
only to propositions which are either categorically true or categorically untrue.  In real
9
It would strictly be more accurate to say that the accuracy of M cannot be proven in the logical system
H.
10
Since H is only sound and consistent in  principle, it could temporarily support an invalid chain of 
reasoning inconsistent with other theorems in H.  However such a chain of reasoning would have to be 
unstable, by which I mean that H would also have to support a chain of reasoning showing this 
fallacious chain to be invalid.  See also Note 5.
11
 Such a system might, for example, contain axioms which simply assert that certain physical 
processes are accurate.   It would be necessary for such a system to be so constituted that these 
additional axioms did not lead to contradictions with other properties of the system;  this would entail 
nonH abandoning certain axioms, such as the Axiom of Fallibility, and having different rules of 
inference from H.   The rules of H, for example, allow M to ask the question "Is there any reason why 
these additional axioms should not be dropped?"
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life, we are often concerned with degrees of probability as much as simple truth or 
untruth.  Often we will have to deal with questions where we simply do not know the 
answer; where the possible answers to a YES/NO question will be YES, NO and 
MAYBE.  This is easily remedied, however, by expressing such questions in the form:
"Is it the case that some proposition p is certainly true?"
To avoid ambiguity we shall define any statement of the form "p is certainly true" as 
meaning that there is zero probability of p being untrue, or that there exists no 
possible world in which p is untrue.  Statements of the form "M is certain of p" will 
be defined as meaning "M is in the evidence state YES for some particular proposition
p".
All questions of this type can be expressed as YES/NO questions.  We can now 
encapsulate the reasoning in this section as a specific proof, which we shall call Proof 
A.  This proof establishes that no physical system which possesses reasoning 
capacities equivalent to those of a human being can correctly answer YES to the 
following question:
"Am I certain that I am answering some given YES/NO question correctly?"
We can express this as our next milestone:
Milestone 4:  For any suitably qualified physical system M (that is, one which is 
capable of human-level reasoning), and for any proposition equivalent to the answer 
to a YES/NO question, there can exist some physical process of type R which will 
answer that question inaccurately.  Therefore any suitably qualified physical system 
can deduce that it can never be certain that its answer to any YES/NO question is 
correct.
This is an extremely general result and it is thus worthwhile checking for any possible
loopholes.  The reader might, for example, consider that since Proof A applies only to 
physical systems, it might not apply to M if M is not certain that it is a physical 
system.  We can deal with this by expressing Milestone 4 in a conditional fashion:
"If M is a physical system there can always exist some physical process of type R 
which will answer any given YES/NO question inaccurately."
Clearly this statement is provable in H.  In order to establish that Proof A certainly 
does not apply to M, M must be able to answer "YES to the question:
"Is it certainly true that M is not a physical system?"
We will call the proposition equivalent to this question p0.  M can now ask the 
question p1:
"Is there some process R0 in M that would answer p0 incorrectly?"
Whatever the answer to p1, M can now ask the question p2:
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"Is there some process R1 in M that would answer p1 incorrectly?"
Clearly we find ourselves in another infinite regress.  In fact generally for any 
proposition pi which can be expressed as a YES/NO question, there will be some 
proposition pi + 1 of the form:
"Is there some process Ri in M that would answer pi incorrectly?"
Thus the sequence of questions which need to be answered in order to establish the 
truth of the proposition
"M is certainly not a physical system"
is non-terminating.  Since M is in fact a physical system, each such question is 
equivalent to a j-type function which must be performed by some physical process, 
which means the sequence of such processes is also non-terminating.   So long as M is
in fact a physical system, it does not matter if M itself is not certain that it is a 
physical system.
Having established this, our first application of Proof A is to the question
"Is it certain that I am conscious?"
where this question is subject to Conditions 1 and 2 as described in then previous 
section.  Any healthy, conscious human being should be able to answer YES to this 
question.  Proof A, however, shows that no suitably qualified physical system can do 
so.   Conscious human beings, therefore, cannot be exclusively physical systems.
Before proceeding to the next section, we will now deal with the outstanding matter 
of the Axiom of Fallibility.   The purpose of this axiom is to express the concept of 
failure, by asserting that there is no way of establishing through purely logical means 
whether some particular physical process is working correctly or incorrectly.  Some 
readers, however, and most especially philosophers, may be attracted to the idea of 
simply dropping this axiom.  One can however deal with the notion of failure without 
expressing it explicitly as an axiom.  Consider some function of the form j which is 
performed by some physical process.  M can now ask the question
"Is it certain that the process which was supposed to perform the function j did not in 
fact perform a mapping of the form r?"
to which the answer must be YES.   The process of answering this question is itself a 
function of the form j -- call this j'. By the Principle of Physicalism, any physical 
system which has performed this function must have done so via some physical 
process. M can now ask the question
"Is it certain that the process which was supposed to perform the function j' did not in
fact perform a mapping of the form r?"
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to which the answer must be YES.  Since the process of answering this question is 
also a function of the form j, which we can call j'', it must by the Principle of 
Physicalism have been performed by some physical process..  In fact in general any 
function ji which is assumed to have been performed correctly implies the existence 
of another function ji + 1 which answers the question equivalent to that assumption.   
This implies a non-terminating sequence of functions and a corresponding non-
terminating sequence of physical processes to perform them.  There is, in other words,
no escape from the infinite regress by abandoning the Axiom of Fallibility.
Verbal summary of the proof
Proof A has two important properties.  Firstly, it is generalizable; it applies to any 
mapping of the form j.  Secondly, it is recursive; it shows that the question of 
whether any given j-type function is performed correctly can itself be represented as 
a j-type function, to which Proof A applies.  
We shall now summarize the proof given in the last section in a somewhat more 
accessible, verbal form.  In doing so we shall illustrate the properties of generality and
recursiveness, and show how these can be used to deal with the apparent objections to
the proof which have been raised informally by some philosophers.   It will be useful 
to base our verbal summary on the notion of evidence; however we shall ignore all 
considerations about the nature of evidence and instead operationalize the function of 
evidence as a sequence of YES/NO questions.  That is, if M has evidence that some 
proposition is true, then it is the function of that evidence to answer the question "Is 
this proposition certainly true?" with either a YES or a NO.
This function we shall refer to as the evidence function, which relates the presence or 
absence of some evidence to the evidence state K of some proposition.  If we define a 
state E so that E is 1 when some evidence exists, and E is 0 when that evidence does 
not exist, then the evidence function relates E to K as follows:
If E = 1 then K = YES
If E = 0 then K = NO
By the Principle of Physicalism, any evidence function in M must be performed by a 
process which supervenes on some physical process or other.  Since we have so far 
ascertained nothing about this process, we shall call it X.
Philosophers, and most particularly epistemologists, traditionally use possible worlds 
semantics to describe conditions of possibility and necessity.  For convenience we 
shall adhere to this convention henceforth; if some proposition is possibly true, we 
shall express this by saying there exists some possible world in which that proposition
is true.  We shall refer to a possible world as epistemically available to M if M cannot 
rule out the possibility that M exists in such a world, given the evidence currently 
available to M.  We shall say that M is certain of some proposition if M can correctly 
decide that there is no possible world epistemically available to M, in which the 
evidence state which corresponds to the truth of that proposition is itself incorrect.
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We shall express the first part of our proof as the following logical argument, which 
we shall call Castor:
It follows from the Principle of Physicalism that any evidence function must 
supervene on some objectively real process X.  Since X is an objectively real process 
it cannot be guaranteed a priori to be a correct instantiation of any function.  We shall 
say that X fails on any occasion on which it does not correctly map some element 
from the domain of the function to its range.  If X fails than its output will be an 
incorrect evidence state.
How can M be certain that the evidence state K is correct, ie that the mapping from E 
to K has been correctly performed?  Only by ruling out the possibility that X has 
failed.  In other worlds, there must be no possible world epistemically available to M 
in which X has failed.  The question of whether X has failed can be represented as the 
question "Is it certainly the case that X has not failed?"  The process of answering this
question is itself equivalent to a new evidence function.
This argument is general -- it applies to any evidence function.  We can express this as
the second part of our proof, which we shall call Pollux:
Castor has generality, ie it applies to any evidence function.  Therefore Castor can be 
applied recursively to the new evidence function generated by Castor.  This will 
generate a third evidence function, to which Castor can be applied recursively yet 
again.  Indeed each time Castor is applied to any evidence function, it will generate a 
another evidence function to which Castor can be applied.  Therefore the correctness 
of any objectively real process X cannot be ascertained without performing a non-
terminating sequence of functions, each of which (by the Principle of Physicalism) 
must be performed by some objectively real process.
Castor and Pollux together are equivalent to the Proof A given in the previous section.
By splitting the proof into two sections in this way, the reader can clearly see how 
Proof A exhibits the two useful properties of generality and recursiveness.  Castor 
establishes generality; Pollux shows that Castor can be applied recursively.
The foregoing tells us that M can never guarantee its own correctness when 
evaluating the truth of any proposition..  However this result has not been proven by 
M, but by us, the readers.  It has been proven in whatever logical system or systems 
underly our reasoning processes, which we must assume are sound in principle.  As in
the previous section, let us call this system H.  However Assumption 1 allows M to 
“inherit” H, as it were, and so to prove Proof A for itself.  This reasoning also allows 
us to disregard the detailed character of H itself, since these details effectively cancel 
out.  The reader’s understanding of Proof A can effectively be regarded as a derivation
of Proof A in the logical system H.
We shall now express the outcome of Proof A as a theorem, which we can call 
Gemini:
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No suitably qualified physical system can exhibit the property of self-certainty, and in 
any system which exhibits self-certainty, the process which subserves self-certainty 
cannot depend on any objectively real process.
Readers should note that Proof A is a proof of exactly this theorem, and not any other. 
A former reviewer of this paper attempted to paraphrase this theorem into a generic 
and rather ambiguous statement about the epistemology of consciousness, and then 
expressed objections based on the resulting ambiguities.  Such a practice is strongly to
be discouraged.  A theoretical proof is a proof of a specific, well-defined proposition, 
derived from a specific set of assumptions according to clear rules of inference.  In 
this respect a theoretical proof is quite different from a philosophical argument.
Another common objection from philosophers is that conscious entities do not need to
calculate or prove that they are conscious, but can in some way simply "ascertain" it.  
The mistake here is to assume that physical systems must necessarily have the same 
properties as conscious human beings.  Any such "ascertaining" can still be 
represented as an evidence function, and if such an evidence function is performed by 
some physical process X (as is required by the Principle of Physicalism) then Proof A 
will apply to it.  Readers should be careful not to attribute unconditionally to physical 
systems the properties of their own consciousness.  Proof A applies generally to any 
system capable of reasoning in H, if both the Principle of Physicalism and the Axiom 
of Fallibility are assumed.
Another objection which has been made frequently to me in private communications 
is that it would be a trivial matter to program a machine to answer "Yes" whenever the
question "Are you certainly conscious?" was asked.  Of course this is true, but such a 
machine would, by definition, not be reasoning according to the rules of H.  Therefore
such an objection has no relevance to the Gemini theorem.
It has also been suggested that the correctness of X does not have to be established for
M to be certain that the evidence state K is correct,12 since in the possible world where
X is correct, M may have access to other, different evidence from the possible world 
in which X fails.  However this argument implicitly assumes another evidence 
function, and Proof A will apply recursively to any such function.  One can express 
this evidence function in terms of the question "Does this other, different evidence 
demonstrate the truth of some proposition?"  Since Proof A is generalizable to all 
evidence functions, it will apply to this one  This is true regardless of what evidence 
M may have access to, since evaluating any such evidence is equivalent to the 
question "Does this evidence demonstrate the truth of some proposition?"  and the 
function of answering such a question will always be subject to Proof A.  No matter 
what evidence M may have access to, therefore, M can never be certain that the 
evidence function implied by that evidence has been correctly performed.
Some philosophers insist that any notion of certainty entailing an infinite sequence of 
propositions is epistemologically unacceptable and unnecessary, and that certainty 
requires only that M is certain of some proposition p.  This would be a reasonable 
remark if the notion of certainty employed here were axiomatic, but for physical 
12 I am indebted to David Chalmers for this objection, and also for the one in the subsequent paragraph.
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systems reasoning in H this is not the case.  The requirement for an infinite sequence 
of functions is in fact a therorem in H, the proof of which is implicit in Proof A.  This 
proof can be expressed explicitly as follows:  We start by assuming that M is certain 
of some proposition p.  By the Principle of Physicalism, the process of determining p 
must supervene on some physical process, say X.  From the Axiom of Fallibility, M 
can deduce that X may be fallible.  By Assumption 1, M can deduce that if X is 
fallible, then the evidence state for p may be incorrect, in which case M cannot be 
certain of p.  Therefore to be certain of p, M must have some way of determining that 
X is operating correctly.  By the Principle of Physicalism, this must supervene on 
some physical process, say X*.  But what process is X*?   It cannot be X, since M 
relies on the process X* to ensure that X is operating correctly.  X therefore depends 
on X*, not the other way round.
Therefore M must assume that X* is some new process X', which is different from X. 
But from the Axiom of Fallibility, M can deduce that X' may be fallible.  Since M's 
certainty of p depends on X, and the correctness of X depends on X', M must have 
some means of determining that X' is operating correctly.  Let us call this process 
X**.  But what process is X**?  It cannot be X', since the correctness of X' depends 
on the correctness of X**.  Neither can it be X, since establishing the correctness of X
requires the correctness of X'.  Therefore we require some new process X'' ... and so 
on ad infinitum.  This leaves us with no choice but to discard the assumption which 
led to the regress -- that is, the Principle of Physicalism.
A rather more serious objection to the Gemini proof is that the rules of H by which the
proof is derived are never explicitly defined.  The proof is derived using the rules of 
classical logic and we must therefore assume, firstly, that our ability as human beings 
to use these rules is sound, and secondly, that our judgement that these rules are the 
correct ones to apply in this situation is also sound.  It is this second judgement which 
is impossible to formalize.  Somehow, H must allow us (and any system which 
reasons like us) to decide that it is classical logic, rather than, say, some 
paraconsistent or quantum logic, which is the correct logic to use in this case.  I do not
believe that this is a serious problem, but it does underline how the proof depends on 
accepting Assumption 2. 
A brief mention must be made of two alternative philosophical approaches which 
some people appear to believe constitute loopholes in Proof A.  The first is 
coherentism -- the doctrine that although individual processes may not be reliable, a 
large ensemble of processes together might be.  This is obviously vulnerable to 
applying Proof A simultaneously to every process in the ensemble.  Alternatively, the 
ensemble can simply be treated as a single process.   More fundamentally, however, 
coherentism cannot be proven to be true; it must therefore be assumed to be true, 
which entails adding another axiom to H.  Since the rules of H must allow M to ask 
the question "Is there any reason why this axiom should not be dropped?" and since 
the answer to this question is by definition NO, coherentism cannot establish absolute 
certainty.
The second philosophical approach which requires some mention is constitutivism 
(Shoemaker, 1990).  The key principle here is that the evidence state for the question 
"Am I certainly conscious?" is a physical state which overlaps wholly or partly with 
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the physical basis of consciousness itself.  This idea was dealt with briefly in Reason 
(2016); the problem here is that, while self-certainty might be allowable if 
constitutivism is true, the process of determining if constitutivism is true can itself be 
represented as an evidence function, to which Proof A will of course apply.   More 
specifically, for constitutivism to work, M must (by the rules of H) be able to answer 
YES to the question "Is the evidence state for consciousness physically identical with 
consciousness itself?"  This question clearly implies an evidence function, to which 
Proof A applies.  
Proof A can be expressed in as a couplet of statements, as follows.  For any suitably 
qualified physical system:
Any evidence function must, by the Principle of Physicalism, be performed by some 
physical process.
The correctness of any physical process must, by the Axiom of Fallibility, be 
determined by some evidence function.
All philosophical objections to Proof A can be dealt with by applying this Gemini 
couplet.  
What kind of process is not a physical process?
The reader may well now be wondering, if Proof A is as generalizable as it appears to 
be, why it does not simply apply to all processes, whether physical or not.  What sort 
of characteristic could possibly differentiate physical processes, which are subject to 
Proof A, from non-physical processes, which are not subject to Proof A?
The answer is that physical processes are defined as being objectively real -- that is, 
they are assumed to have properties which exist independently of the subjective states
which record the values of those properties.  Therefore if we assume a j-type function
performed by some objectively real process X, there will be an objectively real fact 
about whether X is a process of type P, or a process of type R.  The infinite regress, in 
the form of the non-terminating sequence of processes generated by Proof A, arises 
from the need to identify exactly what this objective property is.  No such difficulty 
arises if no objectively real process exists, since there is then no objective property to 
be identified.  The consequence of this however is that whatever process performs the 
j-type function equivalent to self-certainty, this process cannot depend on any 
objectively real process -- it cannot, in other words, depend on any process which is 
external to human consciousness.  Another way of looking at this is to say that any 
process which performs self-certainty must be subjectively real but not objectively 
real.
Discussion
The Gemini theorem itself shows only that self-certainty is impossible in any physical
system.  In order to apply this to the mind-body problem we need to make a further 
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assumption, which is that self-certainty is in fact possible for human beings.  This is 
by its nature an empirical question.  Some will regard it as intuitively obvious that 
human beings are capable of self-certainty, given that self-certainty does not require 
us to make any assumptions about the nature of consciousness or the properties of 
conscious states13.  For those who do not, however, there is a clear empirical 
prediction which can be made.
Gemini implies that self-certainty will entail a violation of the conservation of energy 
(as was explained in Reason, 2016).  We can express this violation as an inequality 
between the energy produced in a physical system and the energy consumed by that 
system.  The difference between energy produced and energy consumed is denoted by
the symbol c (Reason 2016).  It is this inequality which we must somehow detect 
experimentally.
One should bear in mind here that there is no a priori reason why c should be a single 
event; it is quite possible the c effect in the brain is made up of many separate, 
localized effects which all contribute toward a change in the brain’s physical 
evolution.  If one denotes these local effects by cn, then the total effect c will be given
as follows:
     c = c1 + c2 + …….. + cn
Since some of these local effects will be negative, it is theoretically possible for the c 
effect over the whole brain to sum to zero.  This would imply an ad hoc degree of 
symmetry in the brain’s functional architecture which seems to me unlikely.  
Nonetheless we are more likely to be able to detect non-zero c effects in highly 
localized regions of the brain than in larger, more general regions.  
In order to do this we need to rely on proxy measures of energy production such as 
cerebral blood flow, and proxy measures of energy consumption such as changes in 
the brain's electromagnetic field.  If Ep represents some proxy measure of energy 
production, and Ec some proxy for energy consumption, then the absolute c value in 
some small three-dimensional compartment of the brain will be:
13
A special problem exists in the case of self-referential statements such as the question "Is it certain 
that I exist?"  In such a case a system reasoning in H could get as far as Milestone 2 and then argue, 
along the lines of Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, that it does not really matter if the physical process 
which subserves the answering of that question is accurate or not -- the mere fact that such a physical 
process exists is enough to answer the question in the affirmative.  One can express this in the form of a
Cartesian Principle: If P exists then M exists (since P is a process in M).  
Descartes' Cogito can thus be represented in H as a syllogism of the form:
If P exists then M exists;
P exists;
Therefore M exists.
However this syllogism requires M to establish that it is the case that P exists.  Since this clearly entails
a j-type function, Proof A will apply to it, as before.
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cxyz = |((f(Ep) +  energyin)  - (g(Ec) + energyout))|
where energyin and energyout are terms representing the energy flowing into and out of 
the compartment from other compartments.  The Gemini theorem predicts that this 
quantity, summed over three dimensions, will be non-zero.  In practice, measuring the
energy transfer between compartments is not practical.  The result of this is that only 
strongly asymmetric total c effects (those that do not sum to zero) are likely to be 
detectable.  Such asymmetric effects will be indicated by a residual effect cres given 
by:
cres = f(Ep) - g(Ec)
when this is summed over three dimensions.  The detection of symmetric c effects, 
however, relies on assuming that the energyin and energyout terms can both be set to 
zero.  Whether this is possible is unclear at the present time..
What sort of proxy measures of energy production and energy consumption are 
possible?  The first problem to be confronted is that in vivo neuroimaging techniques 
assume the conservation of energy, and therefore do not explicitly distinguish between
energy production and consumption, regarding both as proxy measures for neural 
activity.  Obviously we cannot make this assumption.  We therefore need to eaxmine 
possible neuroimaging techniques a little more closely.
The most widespread imaging technology used in neuroscientific research is 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI).  This relies on the differing 
magnetic properties of oxygenated versus deoxygenated blood (Huettel, Song and 
McCarthy, 2014).  Increased neural activity is thought to trigger a release in blood 
oxygenation levels, which is detectable in the form of the Blood Oxygenation level 
Dependent (BOLD) signal.  Since there is a timelag between the increase in neural 
activity and the resulting increase in blood oxygenation, the temporal resolution of 
this technique is limited to about five seconds.  Spatial resolution for this technique is 
less than five millimeters.  This may be sufficient for detecting symmetric c but it is 
not clear if intercompartmental energy transfer can be ignored using this method.
A more direct measure of energy production is Positron Emission Tomography.  This 
can be used to measure glucose uptake by use of the radioactive tracer 
fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG). (See Vanitha 2011 for a brief description of the 
technique.)  However the requirement for a radioactive tracer, together with the 
complexity and expense of the equipment, make this method problematic for pure 
research purposes.  A possibly more promising approach is Phosphorus Magnetic 
Resonance Spectroscopy (P MRS) which measures the energy generated from the 
hydrolysis of ATP (Zhu, Qiao, Du, Xiong, Liu, Zhang, Ugurbil and Chen, 2012).  
Measuring the other side of the problem, energy consumption, turns out to be a little 
more constricted.  The most obvious technology is Magnetoencephalography (MEG), 
a description of which can be found in Hamalainen, Hari, Ilmoniem, Knuutila and 
Lounasmaa (1993).  MEG measures neural activity in the form of magnetic fields 
generated by dendritic currents.  Since it requires at least 50,000 neurons to generate a
field strong enough to be detectable, this technique has limited spatial resolution (> 
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3mm) which depends on making assumptions about the nature of the neural activity 
which has generated the signal; however it has excellent temporal resolution.   A less 
well-known technique is Event-Related Optical Signal detection (Gratton and Fabiani 
2001).  This method detects neuronal activity by via selective absorption of infra-red 
light.  It has excellent temporal resolution but its spatial resolution is limited to about 
a centimeter.  It also has the disadvantage that the technique only works to a depth of 
up to 5cm into the head, and it is not clear if c can be assumed to occur within the 
cortex.  However a potential advantage of EROS is that it can be carried out 
simultaneously with a measurement of hemodynamic response in the form of NIRS, 
or  Near Infra-Red Signal detection (Gratton, Goodman-Wood and Fabiani 2001).  
This property could be especially useful in detecting c.
It is the my hope that some or all of these techniques may offer the basis for a 
practical experiment to detect the c effect.  Anyone who believes they can assist in 
carrying out such an experiment is urged to contact the author.
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